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ABSTRACT: Within the broader context of the 1590 grain shortage crisis, for 
many historians the main food crisis that had struck Mediterranean in the 
sixteenth century, the author focuses on the continual problem of grain supply 
in the Republic of Dubrovnik. The pattern of government intervention is 
reconstructed not only in the face of famine, but also in relation to the system 
of food administration taken as a whole. The aim of this article is to highlight 
the political genius and commercial enterprise with which Dubrovnik managed 
to secure its demands for cereals through a privileged relationship with the 
Ottoman Empire, here defined as Ragusa’s ‘corn diplomacy’.
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The Mediterranean society, according to Braudel, “never lived under the sign of 
affluence”.2 Famine, in other words, represented “normality” in a general situa-
tion in which “the Western man had to adapt himself to a constant dearth of food”,3 
1 I wish to thank Nenad Vekarić, Director of the Institute for Historical Sciences of Croatian 
Academy of Arts and Sciences in Dubrovnik for his hospitality and Vesna Miović, who first 
suggested I should write this article and whose esteem and constant help throughout all these years 
have been—and still are—of fundamental importance for my research.
2 Fernand Braudel, Civiltà e imperi nel Mediterraneo nell’età di Filippo II, I, Torino: Einaudi, 
1986 [La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II. Paris 51982]: p. 614.
3 Fernand Braudel, Civiltà materiale, economia e capitalismo, I, Le strutture del quotidiano 
(secoli XV-XVIII), Torino: Einaudi, 1982 [original title: Civilisation matérielle, économie et 
capitalisme, XVe-XVIIIe siècle, I. Paris 1979]: p. 89.
72 Dubrovnik Annals 14 (2010)
to such an extent that one could claim that “the idea of a precarious condition 
determined  by huge variations in the levels of agricultural production was 
deeply rooted in the society of the ancien régime”.4
At the same time, however, grain shortages also represent a unique oppor-
tunity for historians to investigate the politics of food administration in the 
early modern period. Indeed, in “normal” times, these politics seem to be part 
and parcel of a wider field of government activity, so that “the sources seem to 
become less visible”, demanding from the historian “a great skill in the analysis 
of administrative procedures and a thorough knowledge of the competence of 
each branch of the administration”.5 Quite to the contrary, during a period of 
famine everything becomes more simple, not only in relation to the obliged 
strategies of government intervention (food rationing and/or expulsion of 
undesired population, search for food supplies outside the traditional trade 
circuits etc.): the need for public authorities “to gain the utmost external rele-
vance for their activities”6 provides historians with an immediate knowledge—
and with the opportunity to make an easier survey—of their interventions.
Yet a historian needs here to be cautious: it is true that, on one hand, studying 
food administration by means of a “conjuncture-based model”7 makes it more 
understandable, but, on the other hand, one should avoid regarding it “as an 
unchanging factor [...] undergoing only superficial changes during very short 
and critical periods of time”.8 One should not mechanically apply a pattern of 
government intervention worked out for different historical contexts that were 
not necessarily characterized by the same level of intelligibility and com-
parability. In other words, not only every individual crisis differs from the 
other, but it is what goes on between one critical moment and another that 
sheds light on the entire system:9 a long-term study appears thus as the best 
possible approach.
4 Alberto Guenzi, »Le magistrature e le istituzioni alimentari«, in: Gli archivi per la storia 
dell’alimentazione, I. Roma: Ministero per i beni culturali e ambientali and Ufficio centrale per i 
beni archivistici, 1995: p. 292.
5 A. Guenzi, »Le magistrature e le istituzioni alimentari«: p. 289.
6 Ibidem.
7 Ivo Mattozzi, Francesco Bolelli, Carmen Chiasera, Daniela Sabbioni, »Il politico e il pane a 
Venezia (1570-1650): calmieri e governo della sussistenza«. Società e Storia 20 (1983): p. 273.
8 I. Mattozzi, F. Bolelli, C. Chiasera, D. Sabbioni, »Il politico e il pane a Venezia (1570-1650)«: 
p. 272.
9 As Mattozzi effectively argues, what “matters is the variation in price from one critical period 
to another” (ibid.). I address here only some of the issues concerning the politics of food administra-
tion that are discussed more widely in my on-going study, to which I refer the readers for more details.
73S. d’Atri, Per conservare la città tributtaria et divota...
What I am about to put forward here is the analysis of a grain shortage 
crisis—one that was, indeed, for many historians the main sixteenth-century 
crisis—within the context of a comparative approach embracing the whole 
century.10 I shall thus try to reconstruct the pattern of government intervention 
used by the Republic of Ragusa not only in the face of famine, but in relation 
to the system of food administration taken as a whole.
Il nostro bisogno consiste in la prestezza: famine viewed from Ragusa
“[...] Essendo lo Territorio nostro privo di frumenti per essere questi luoghi 
nostri sterili, e sassosi”;11 no doubt, such an image of a poor and disadvantaged 
country was one of the most recurrent self-representative stereotypes instru-
mentally used by the Republic. It is equally certain, however, that the territory 
of the Republic was indeed barren and—excluding Konavle12—scarcely fit for 
cultivation.13 As a consequence Ragusa imported wheat in order to feed its 
inhabitants: “où il ne se mange ung seul grain de bled qu’il ne faille aller 
cercher à cinq cens mil d’icy”.14
10 For a general overview on crises in early modern Europe, see, Famine, disease and social 
order in early modern society, ed. John Walter and Roger Schofield. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989—a book dedicated to the memory of Andrew P. Appleby, a pioneer in this 
field of research—and the more recent study by Andrew Cunningham and Ole P. Grell, The Four 
Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Religion, War, Famine and Death in Reformation Europe. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000.
11 Among many possible examples, I chose a letter dated 28 October 1563, written to Paulus 
de Menze, who had been sent to Naples to buy the tratta needed for the importation of 500 carra 
of wheat from Apulia (Lettere e commissioni, Lettere di Levante, ser. 27.1, vol. 29, f. 129v, State 
Archives of Dubrovnik, hereafter cited as: SAD).
12 On this important region see Konavoski zbornik 1 (1982) and Konavle u prošlosti, sadašnjosti 
i budućnosti, vol. 1, Dubrovnik: Zavod za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Dubrovniku, 1998.
13 This does not necessarily mean that the Republic did not try, in every reasonable way, to 
support agricultural production where it was possible to develop it: we may see an example of this 
in the measures—attested since the end of the fifteenth century—aimed at limiting the expansion 
of vineyards by granting each family in the region of Dubrovačko primorje (coastal area to the 
north of Ragusa) a piece of land “equivalent to one quarter of a soldo, the latter of which equaled 
1,680 square meters”; cfr. Nenad Vekarić, »The population of the Dubrovnik Republic in the 
fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries«. Dubrovnik Annals 2 (1998): p. 11 (a longer version 
of the article in Croatian appeared in Anali Zavoda za povijesne znanosti u Dubrovniku 29 (1991): 
pp. 7-22). Periodic controls over the implementation of this prescription rested with a special 
commission, whose reports also represent an excellent demographic source, as was first 
demonstrated by Nenad Vekarić in his works on the demographic history of the Republic.
14 Ernest Charrière, Négociations de la France dans le Levant, vol. III. Paris: Imprimerie 
Nationale, 1880: p. 245.
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This well-known observation, contained in a letter written in January 1572 
by François de Noailles, bishop of Dax, to the French King Charles IX, may 
well be slightly exaggerated, but it is a good portrait of the state of dependence 
in which Ragusa was forced to live; it may also be regarded as an indication of 
the Republic’s extraordinary ability in coping with its difficulties. Indeed: “Le 
navi, e il mar, son’ invece à Raugia, di campi e d’oliveti [...]”, wrote Serafino 
Razzi towards the end of the sixteenth century, adding that: “à questa penuria 
di grano e d’olio, supplisce la gran comodità del mare. Imperochè con le loro 
molte navi tengono i Raugei la città abondante d’ogni bene”.15
In reading these words, one cannot help recalling the analysis of food ad-
ministration policies in Europe made by Ferdinando Galiani in his Dialogues 
su le commerce des blés (1770): on one hand, Ragusa perfectly falls within the 
number of the small States in which the administration of corn supplies “è un 
affare di stretta competenza della politica”;16 on the other hand it also possesses 
a “marineria fiorente”, and this makes it similar to the Republic of Genoa or to 
the United Provinces, middle-sized States “posseggono terreni così miseri, 
così magri, che [...] possiamo considerarli poco o niente, se non producono 
affatto grano”.17 Indeed it is this navy that makes the difference: “Uno Stato 
piccolo senza una flotta può acquistare il grano soltanto dalle province vicine 
[...]. Ma una nazione con una marineria fiorente e un grande mare aperto 
davanti a sé cerca e trova, anche in capo al mondo, il mercato conveniente”.18
Ragusa did not need to reach “in capo al mondo” in order to obtain wheat 
supplies. In fact, for most of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Apulia was 
the main supplier: it is not without reason that in Francesco Balducci Pegolotti’s 
Pratica della Mercatura (1343)—probably the most important medieval 
handbook on trade, written by the agent of the powerful Bardi family who 
were among the biggest corn merchants in that period—Ragusa was mentioned 
only once in Chapter XXXVIII, entitled Come la misura del grano di Puglia 
15 Serafino Razzi, La storia di Ragusa. Lucca: Per Vincentio Busdraghi, 1595 [reprint Bologna: 
Arnaldo Forni Editore, 1980]: pp. 119 and 124.
16 Ferdinando Galiani, Dialogo sul commercio dei grani, Torino: Boringhieri, 1958: p. 40. 
Galiani, however, makes direct reference to Geneva and not to Ragusa; in fact the latter is not even 
mentioned.
17 F. Galiani, Dialogo sul commercio dei grani: p. 54: On Genua see also Ferdinando Galiani, 
Considerazioni sul sistema annonario di Genova, ed. Luigi Dal Pane. Bagnacavallo: Società Tipo-
grafica Editrice, 1935.
18 Ibidem, p. 63.
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torna in diverse parti del Mondo.19 But the dependence on Apulia is above all 
demonstrated by the data on the imports of corn across the fourteenth century20 
and by the fact that no less than 79% of 12,387 stara “frumenti comunis 
reposta in fossis” at the end of the fifteenth century came from that region.21
Thereafter, the Levant will play master. In fact, starting from 1458, Ragusa—
after the end of the Venetian rule in 1358 formally submitted to the Kingdom 
of Hungary—begins to pay an annual tribute to the Ottoman Empire that, from 
the initial amount of 1,500 golden ducats will grow up to stabilize at 12,500 
golden ducats in 1482.22 A formal submission to the Porte that will open up the 
large and protected Turkish markets for Ragusan ships23: indeed, apart from 
19 “Salme cento di formento di Puglia fanno a Raugia staia 260 in 265”: see Franceso Balducci 
Pegolotti, La Pratica della Mercatura, in: Giovanni Francesco Pagnini, Della decima e di varie 
altre gravezze imposte dal Comune di Firenze, vol. II, part III, Lisbona and Lucca, 1766 [reprint 
Bologna: Arnaldo Forni Editore, 1967]: p. 169. On handbooks on trade—such as Balducci Pegolotti, 
but also Giovanni di Antonio da Uzzano and pseudo-Chiarini—as a source for the study of wheat 
trade in the Mediterranean during the Middle Ages, see Ruggiero Romano, A propos du commerce 
du blé dans la Méditerranée des XIVe et XVe siècles, in: Éventail de l’histoire vivante. Hommage 
a Lucien Febvre, vol. II, Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1953: pp. 149–161.
20 Dušanka Dinić-Knežević, »Trgovina žitom u Dubrovniku u XIV veku«. Godišnjak 
Filozofskog fakulteta u Novom Sadu 10 (1967): pp. 121-124. On the relationship between Puglia 
and Ragusa in this period see Mirjana Popović-Radenković, »Le relazioni commerciali fra 
Dubrovnik (Ragusa) e la Puglia nel periodo angioino (1266-1442)«. Archivio Storico per le Province 
Napoletane 37 (1958): pp. 73-104 and 38 (1959): pp. 153-206 and the more recent study by Victor 
Rivera Magos, »La Chiave de tutta la Puglia. Presenze straniere, attività commerciali e interessi 
mediterranei a Manfredonia, ‘agriporto’ di Capitanata (secoli XIII - XVI)«, in: Storia di Manfre-
donia, vol. I - Il Medioevo, ed. Saverio Russo. Bari: Edipuglia, 2008: pp. 63-99.
21 Debita notarie pro comuni, ser. 36, vol. 1, ff. 101v–102r (SAD). I recall that Ragusa’s staro 
was equivalent to about 99 liters (71,5 Kg.) and was divisible into 6 copelli. From this source, 
dated 1 June 1499, we learn that in Ragusa there were 28 fosse (cfr. infra), five of which were used 
for storing wheat classified as “old” and one was reserved for the needs of Ston, the city on the 
Pelješac peninsula, center of a saltpan.
22 See Vesna Miović, »Turske priznanice o uplaćenom dubrovačkom haraču«. Anali Zavoda za 
povijesne znanosti u Dubrovniku 42 (2004): pp. 53-77 and, in general, eadem Dubrovačka 
diplomacija u Istambulu, Zagreb–Dubrovnik: Zavod za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Dubrovniku, 
2003. The defeat of Mohács, in 1526, will mark the definitive exit of scene of the Kingdom of 
Hungary and the end of what could be defined as “double protectorate”.
23 Ragusa began to use the eastern markets well before becoming tributary to the Porte. Indeed, 
if the first mention of the purchase of Turkish wheat dates back to 1347, thereafter we find more 
and more documents attesting the presence of Levantine wheat, where “Levantine” means coming 
from Albania or Greece, which the sources call “Romania”: see Barisa Krekić, Dubrovnik (Raguse) 
et le Levant au Moyen Âge. Paris-La Haye: Mouton, 1961: pp. 91-94 and, for a more general 
overview of the Turkish market, Kate Fleet, European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman 
State. The Merchants of Genoa and Turkey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
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the burden of paying the haraç,24 Ragusa enjoys a truly independent position 
within the Ottoman Empire,25 bolstered up by large commercial privileges, 
first of all the privilege of being the only nation that was allowed to buy wheat 
in the territory of the Empire, at the only condition that it should not be resold 
in Dār ul-Harb, that is to say in non-Muslim countries.26 
Corn had to be stored properly and, indeed, starting from the fourteenth 
century,27 Ragusa launches a policy of structural intervention aiming at the 
creation of a storage system.28 The chronology of this policy closely matches 
that of the crises, both in food supply and in other fields: the year 1410—when 
Ragusa started a large-scale project for the stockpiling of corn29—coincided 
with a difficult period in which the very survival of Ragusa was at stake.30 
24 On Ragusa’s real position within the Ottoman imperial system, see Nicolaas H. Biegman, 
The Turco-Ragusan relationship according to the firmāns of Murād III (1575-1595) extant in the 
State Archives of Dubrovnik. The Hague-Paris: Mouton, 1967.
25 This contrasts with a stereotype of Venetian origin—which is hard to eradicate even in today’s 
historiography, and especially among Italian (but also non-Italian) historians, who often continue to 
use the contemporary, scornful jugdements by the Serenissima as a veritable historical source—a 
stereotype according to which the tribute was nothing less than a due act of total sub mission: “La 
comunità di Ragusi vive, come fa la quaglia sotto lo sparviero, tutta piena di timore; paga il suo 
tributo di zecchini dodicimila all’anno, e più altrettanto di estraordinario, spesso viene travagliata 
da avanie turchesche, ma tutte le accomoda con danari per vivere, e sostentare quella sua apparente 
libertà” (“Relazione dell’Impero Ottomano di Lorenzo Bernardo del 1592”, in: Relazioni di 
Ambasciatori veneti al Senato, ed. Luigi Firpo, vol. XIII. Torino: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1984: p. 389).
26 See N. H. Biegman, The Turco-Ragusan relationship: pp.107-125: and one should not forget 
that Ragusa benefited from a favourable import duty (2% whereas all the other merchants paid 
4%) and from the abolition of many minor tributes.
27 The 1272 Statute does not mention any particular structure for the storage of wheat, but only 
refers to the «fundico», which was the only place where wheat sales could take place: Statutum 
Ragusinum, Manuali pratici del Cancelliere - Leggi e Istruzioni, ser. 21.1, vol. 9, now entirely 
published in Statut Grada Dubrovnika. Dubrovnik: Državni Arhiv u Dubrovniku, 2002.
28 On this system see now Stefano d’Atri, »“Adi 2 di marzo 1590 porta fornita”. Rupe, il granaio 
di Ragusa (Dubrovnik)«. Mélanges de l’École française de Rome. Italie et Méditerranée 120/2 
(2008): pp. 569-580.
29 On 21 January the Massari bladorum received an order “de reperiendo unum magistrum a 
faciendo fossas ad tenendum blada” (Reformationes, ser. 2, vol. 33, f. 133r; SAD) and in the 
following March Antonio Manfei from Trani was entrusted with this mandate (ibidem, f. 141v). 
Until then, the city only possessed a single dry well ( fossa) of the capacity of 500 stara, about 
which we know very little, except that it was certainly operative in 1409: see Lukša Beretić, 
»Dubrovačka žitnica ’Rupe’«. Dubrovnik 2/2-3 (1956): p. 71.
30 Having been at war from 1403 to 1405 with the Kingdom of Bosnia whose troops devastated 
its territory, from 1409 onwards Ragusa was to cope with a greater danger, caused by the Venetian 
expansion in Dalmatia, after Venice had acquired the rights of Ladislas, King of Naples, on part 
of the Eastern coast of the Adriatic sea. See: Bariša Krekić, Dubrovnik in the 14th and 15th. A 
City between East and West. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972: p. 49.
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Whereas the proposal of building a large granary (Rupe) was advanced in 
1541, when the city had just overcome the terrible famine that struck the city 
in the last months of 1539 and was foreshadowed in December 1538 by the shut 
down of the Apulian markets.31
Indeed, in the first months of 1539 the Republic already begins to perceive 
the danger. In a letter written on 19 February, the Rector of Ragusa replies to 
the ambassadors sent by the Spanish governor of Herceg Novi that he cannot 
grant the amounts of corn they requested because “noi siamo ridutti ad una 
extrema penuria nella città”; and he goes on to explain this difficulty not only 
with the shut down of the Apulian market, but also with the Ottoman ban on 
exports from the Levant and with the high prices of Sicilian grain that is now 
burdened with new taxes.32 
Needless to say, the claim of Ragusan authorities that they do not know “in 
che modo potere nutrire el populo nostro non havendo che puocha vittuaglia 
della vecchia”33 conceals more substantial political reasons: in no ways can 
Ragusa help the new rulers of Castelnuovo,34 and thus fall out with the 
Ottomans.35 But the danger must have been real, if in August the Senate 
decided that all the owners of Ragusan ships should bring the corn loaded in 
the Levant to Ragusa, “Trovandosi la citta nostra in penuria e carestia de 
frumenti, causata dalla triste raccolta, la quale è stata in molte parti d’Italia e 
dalla clausura delle trattae, tra molte altre provisioni fatte per frumenti”.36 This 
31 Lettere di Levante, vol. 22, ff. 24v-26v, 4 December 1538. In fact it was no longer possible 
to buy wheat in Apulia since the first months of 1537, even though Ragusa—on the strength of its 
ancient right, confirmed by Charles V in 1523 and 1531, to import 500 carra of wheat from the 
Kingdom of Naples—repeatedly tried to reach Sicily (Lettere di Levante, vol. 21, ff. 72r-73r and 
Acta Consilii Rogatorum, ser. 3, vol. 44, on the claims for Sicilian wheat).
32 Lettere di Levante, vol. 22, f. 30r. Hereafter, the word Rector indicates the Ragusan 
government, from the moment that all the letters of the Republic began with the formula “Il Rettore 
di Ragusa con il suo Consiglio et di Pregati”.
33 Ibidem.
34 One must note that after the defeat suffered at the Prevesa during the war waged by the First 
Holy League, in October 1538 Andrea Doria had reconquered the Turkish stronghold, which was 
then recaptured by the Ottomans on 10 August 1539 with an expedition led by Hayreddîn 
(Barbarossa).
35 It is not without meaning that the Rector did not refrain from stressing that the city was full 
of “hebrei e turchi assai residenti” who could act as spies of the sançakbey, the governor of a 
sançak, the basic administrative unit of the Ottoman empire (Lettere di Levante, vol. 22, ff. 
29v–30v).
36 Lettere di Levante, vol. 22, f. 67r, 2 august 1539.
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document, known as Patentes pro navibus, ut omnes frumentum conduceant 
Rhagusium, may be regarded as the first attempt to establish an effective and 
compulsory service for the supply of wheat. This is one of the instruments that 
the Republic will use so as to struggle against famine, and, significantly 
enough, it will be officially created during the 1555 famine (see infra).37
On November 1539 the Minor Council (Consiglio Minore) makes some 
important decisions: on one hand, it obliges the Officials “deputatis super 
frumento comunis nostris” to store millet rather than corn in the staple “attenta 
penuria frumenti quam civitas hic nostra patetur”; on the other hand, it 
simultaneously decides to ration wheat in the measure of 1 and ½ copelli per 
person, asking that the Officials must receive from each family-head a sworn 
declaration upon the number of those “quas habebit in domo sua”.38 In less than 
a year the price of frumentum comunis rises from 9 to 13 grossi per copello39 
and the Republic will even turn to Marseilles,40 an entrepôt definitely outside 
the range of the city’s traditional food-supplying areas.41 
37 The Republic, from at least 1533 onwards, had also started to use what we may define as 
“obbligo del quarto”, which meant that all Ragusa’s patroni had to carry ¼ of every wheat cargo 
to Ragusa and deliver it to the massari blavarum: see Secreta Rogatorum, ser. 4, vol. 1, f. 88, 15 
October 1533 (SAD). In this case the difference between my chronology and that of Maurice 
Aymard might be due to the fact that the French historian focused his research in the second half 
of the sixteenth century: see Maurice Aymard, Venise, Raguse et le commerce du blé pendant la 
seconde moitié du XVIe siècle, Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N, 1966.
38 Acta Minoris Consilii, ser. 5, vol. 38, f. 286v. Thereafter, in February 1540, the government 
even suspended the sale of millet, replacing it with “mistura seu sumiziza”, sent by the ambassador 
in Herzegovina Sigismundus de Gozze, whose price was subsequently fixed at 6 and ½ grossi 
(Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 44, f. 282v).
39 Acta Minoris Consilii, vol. 44, ff. 263v, 269r.
40 This request has already been made in January 1539, when there were the first indications 
that Apulia’s markets would be shut down (Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 44, f. 126v) and we are 
informed that the purchase actually took place in a document dated January 1540, in which we 
learn that Frano Skočibuha, the patrono of the ship who had been to Marseille, had gained on the 
hire of 10 grossi established for the transport of 400 carra of wheat (ibidem, ff. 269v-270r).
41 This was the first and last case (at least during the sixteenth century) in which Ragusa went 
so far in the search of wheat. Provence, on the other hand, was of fundamental importance for 
Genoa during the famine that struck the city in 1541, given that to the “Genovesi venne il soccorso 
donde meno l’attendevano, [...] poterono procacciarsi il frumento dai mercanti di Provenza, 
concedendolo Francesco I di nemico divenuto loro benevolo” (cfr. Alfonso Corradi, Annali delle 
epidemie accorse in Italia dalle prime memorie fino al 1850, part II - dal 1501 a tutto il 1600, 
Bologna: Tipi Gamberini e Parmeggiani, 1867: p. 20, note 1).
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In the end there will be more than 4,000 victims and a strong pressure will 
be put on the Republic’s traditional structures of social care,42 as Nicolò de Ra-
gnina will write in his Annali di Ragusa: “per detta fame fu speso dall’erario 
comune d. 2000, per nutrimento delli mendicanti et per populo menuto, po-
nendoli alli ospitali: oltra che compravano in el paese lo grano a grossetti 22 
lo copello, per poter meglio subvenir allo populo menuto. Nelle qual spese 
consumò il pubblico più de d. 8000”.43
The famine was made even more difficult by what Angelo Antonio Frari 
described as a “doppio flagello”:44 “L’anno di Cristo 1540 mortalità di febre 
cominciò a Ragusa, nel principio di martio, (ed era) ira di Dio. Così fu per tutto 
il mondo, ne alcun rimedio si trovava, salvo buon governo con la dieta. La qual 
malattia durò molti mesi”.45
It is only during the first months of 1541 that the situation returns to 
“normality”: in March wheat is sold in the city’s grain warehouse ( fondaco) at 
the same price as in the period before the crisis, that is 8 grossi per copello, the 
same as in December 1538,46 and the Republic can afford ordering its envoy in 
Barletta “di conservare nelle fosse dove stanno” the supplies of corn he had 
bought, considering “come stanno li granari e fosse del comune nostro, per la 
moltitudine delli frumenti condutti li giorni passati”.47
42 The situation became so difficult that, for example, Pietro Fogliatino “mosso da compassione 
vedendo tanta carestia quanta in Ragugia”, went “in Manfredonia di Puglia a comprar pane, come 
gia due volte havea fatto prima, senza nessuna provisione” (Lamenta politica, ser. 11, vol. 4, f. 
140r; SAD).
43 Annali di Ragusa del Magnifico Ms. Nicolò di Ragnina, ed. S. Nodilo (hereafter cited as: 
Ragnina). [Monumenta spectantia Historiam slavorum meridionalium, XIV]. Zagabriae: JAZU, 
1883: p. 293. It must be emphasized that on 26 February 1540 the Senate decided to build “unum 
xenodochium seu hospitale” for the benefit of the poor and of the sick, both citizens and foreigners 
(Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 44, f. 291v): this was the Domus Christi hospital, whose history 
has now been reconstructed in Tatjana Buklijaš and Irena Benyovsky, »Domus Christi in Late-
Medieval Dubrovnik: a Therapy for the Body and Soul«. Dubrovnik Annals 8 (2004): pp. 81-107.
44 Angelo Antonio Frari, Della peste e della pubblica amministrazione sanitaria. Venezia: 
Antonelli, 1840: p. 358.
45 Ragnina: pp. 293-294. According to Serafino Razzi, there were more than 4,550 casualties, 
including 56 nobles (Razzi, La storia di Ragusa: p. 95).
46 Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 45, f. 118r; vol. 44, f. 121r, 14 December 1538. It must be noted 
that, although Ragnina’s  description of the famine is, on the whole, fairly plausible and is confirmed 
by other sources, nonetheless the Annali purport that the food shortage lasted for 22 months starting 
from October 1539 (cfr. Ragnina: p. 293).
47 Lettere di Levante, vol. 22, f. 234r, 25 May 1541.
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The following crises apparently follow the same scenario. The “penuria di 
grano [...] il che nasce da male e triste raccolte”,48 is followed by the shut-down 
of the Apulian market. Yet, the famine that strikes Italy between 1548 and 
1551 does not apparently affect Ragusa. On 16 January 1549 the Senate even 
decrees to move the pupils from the building near S. Francis to a larger school 
“super fundico comunis nostri”, in order to use the former building to store 
wheat, because “horrea comunis sunt plena”49—the food shortage of the years 
1555-57 is different for at least one reason: it strikes Istanbul, the big capital of 
the Ottoman Empire.50
This does not only mean that the Sublime Porte will not grant permission 
to buy corn, but also that it will seize merchant ships at its will and, first of all, 
Ragusan vessels. Thus the Republic will be bound, on one hand, to apologize 
to Pope Paul IV for placing ships flying Saint Blaise’s flag at the orders of the 
Sultan51 and, on the other hand, to seek alternative markets, especially in the 
Balkans. 
In July 1555 the Senate already bought 5,000 stara of grain and a quantity 
of millet that were to be carried on land via Neretva, Zvornik (on the river 
Drina, nowadays at the boundary between Bosnia and Serbia), Albania and 
Patras.52 In January 1556, considering “la penuria e Caristia qual habbiamo di 
48 Lettere di Levante, vol. 26, f. 7r, 25 September 1555.
49 Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 48, f. 234r. In the previous months the Republic had bought 
wheat from Apulia (ibidem, f. 193r, September 1548) and had cancelled the orders previously sent 
to its patroni in the Gulf of Patras because wheat had been purchased at a better price from foreign 
merchants (2 thousand stara from two Greek patroni at 5 grossi and ½ per copello: ibidem, f. 
205v, November 1548).
50 One cannot help recalling Fernand Braudel’s description of “hunger” in the biggest early mod-
ern period city: every day, “the city consumed between 300 and 500 tons of wheat, providing work 
for its 133 bakers [...]”, and needless to say, a large quantity of meat quantifiable in almost 7 million 
sheep and 200 thousand cattle (F. Braudel, Civiltà e imperi nel Mediterraneo nell’età di Filippo 
II: p. 371; these data were drawn from Robert Mantran’s study on Istanbul in the second half of 
the seventeenth century but Braudel considered that they could be extended even to the preceding 
period). Recent studies by Turkish historians slightly reduced some of the figures concerning 
Istanbul: by the middle of the sixteenth century the city’s population came close to 500,000 
inhabitants and, on the basis of the bakers’ production capacity, the annual volume of wheat trade 
was estimated at about 97,000 tons (cfr. E. Özveren, »Black Sea and the Grain Provisioning of 
Istanbul in the Longue Durée«, in: Nourrir les cités de Méditerranée. Antiquité – Temps modernes, 
ed. Brigitte Marin and Catherine Virlouvet. Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2003: pp. 224-225).
51 See the long letter sent on 18 March 1556 to the ambassador in Rome, by which we also 
learn that the famine has struck Persia as well (Lettere di Levante, vol. 26, ff. 50r– 60r).
52 Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 53, f. 48r, 26 July 1555.
81S. d’Atri, Per conservare la città tributtaria et divota...
Grani [...]”, Ragusa sends “provido e prudente” Iacobus Gion on a journey to 
the Bassa of Bosnia and Zvornik with a cociumo for the purchase of 300 mutti 
of corn to be carried to Ragusa via Neretva and Ston, instructing at the same 
time another envoy to look for millet and sorghum.53
This crisis is a serious one,54 and Ragusa will cope with it mainly by tight-
ening controls over markets and supplies.55 A few months before the famine 
started, the Republic established—or, more precisely, institutionalized—the 
“compulsory service for the wheat supply” (servizio obbligatorio del grano). 
Applying a decree issued by the Senate on 20 April 1555, ten days later Ragusa 
sends “lettere patentes pro navibus extractes ad capellum” to its consuls: “COme 
ciascun anno ne convien nel tempo delle raccolte far provvisione di condur 
dalle parti di levante la summa di dumillia carri di fromento per uso della Città 
e Territorio nostro e non trovandosi haver la comodita di navi siamo stati 
afforzati aggravar qualche padrone a far dui viaggi uno doppo l’altro acio la 
Citta non havesse patire [...] et volendo proveder che di qua in avanti non habbi 
tal inconveniente seguire [...], abbiamo ordinato che tutte le navi tanto grandi 
quanto piccole [...] condur ogni anno la summa di dumille carri di fromento 
[...]”.56
But at present these measures are not sufficient. Thus the government 
resorts to a sort of census of possible cargos, in an attempt to encourage the 
arrival of corn in the city, going so far as to grant un unusual privilege in that 
anybody carrying wheat to Ragusa “partibus ultra flumen” may keep the 
53 Lettere di Levante, vol. 26, ff. 41r– 43r, letters dated 22 January 1556. The cociumo (sometimes 
written hochiumo), that is the hüküm, was the part of the firman containing the Sultan’s authorization 
and a document that permitted Ragusa to buy wheat.
54 The Republic went so far as to ask permission to buy wheat even from the Duke of Ferrara 
and the Duke of Urbino, who usually appear in the city’s documents as demanders: cfr. Lettere di 
Levante, vol. 26, f. 141r (27 December 1556); on Ferrara, f. 99v and the following (September 
1556) and ff. 160v-161r (February 1557) on Urbino.
55 The building of the big granary was carried out expeditiously. In November 1555 it was 
decided that the officials entrusted with the building of the pits “debeant cum omne possibile 
diligentia” go on with these works, “iuxta formam modelli facti” (Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 
53, f. 115r); and it is not by mere chance that the only documents we possess on the actual works 
(such as the receipts for the payment of the lime and the warrants issued to the labourers who 
worked at the building) all go back to the period 1555-1558 (see S. d’Atri, »“Adi 2 di marzo 1590 
porta fornita”«).
56 Lettere di Levante, vol. 25, f. 287v. Note that in order to make this service more convenient, 
it was declared that the ships “nel venir a Raugia [prima di partire per il Levante] habbino condur 
uno carico del sale per il quale habbino haver il pagamento [...]”.
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amount of corn needed for himself and his family for six months and hand 
over the rest to the city’s staple.57
In 1557 the crisis has not yet abated, as shown by a request for cociumi to 
import millet from Bosnia and Albania, and beans (and even sorghum) from 
Alexandria,58 by the rise in the price of frumentum comunis to 10 grossi59 and, 
above all, by the fact that the Senate assigns, until June 1558, a prize, equivalent 
in value to the gabella, to those “civibus nostris” who take corn into Ragusa.60 
The situation returns, very gradually, to normality. Yet, even for the year 1558 
there are contrasting indications: if on one side the Senate accepts a request by 
“D. Antianos” from Ancona asking for 600 stara of wheat,61 on the other side, 
an exemption is introduced from paying duties “super bladis et aliis bladis 
minutis” imported in Ragusa, and a prize is assigned to anybody who imported 
biave by land.62 
Given this difficult situation, the Republic tries to make the best of its 
privileged position within the Ottoman Empire. On 4 May 1558 the Rector 
writes a letter to the Tribute Ambassadors in Constantinople: “procurarete 
d’impetrare dalla porta li cociumi, per cavare dalla schala del volo, loghi 
circumvicini, la summa de otto mille mutti di frumento [...], e quando vi fusse 
replicato, che la summa fusse troppo grande, responderete, chel nostro paese, 
è tutto sterile, e sasoso, e non habbiamo dove servirse, che nelle parti di Levante 
e che glie coveniente cosa, che noi quali siamo devotissimi caracciari della 
porta [...]”.63
57 Acta Maioris Consilii, vol. 44, f. 50v, 5 November 1555. Still in 1557, the Ragusan government 
will arrive to give “civibus nostris” that bring wheat to Ragusa a commission like the gabella until 
June 1558 (Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 54, f. 52v, 5 October 1557).
58 Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 54, f. 42v, 19 August 1557 and f. 44r, 21 August 1557. Note 
that the request for cociumi has to be made through Marinus de Crieva, called back in Constantinople 
as Tribute ambassador.
59 Ibidem, f. 50v, 24 September 1557.
60 Ibidem, f. 52v, 5 October 1557.
61 Ibidem, f. 156r, 4 June 1558. The agreed price is 10 grossi per copello to be paid before the 
end of the month, with the plegiaria of Johannes de Gondola, who was Ragusa’s agent in Marca.
62 Ibidem, f. 176v, 17 August 1558. The duty (gabella) on the imports of wheat will be 
reintroduced only in March 1559, and it will be fixed at 3 grossi per copello (ibidem, f. 245v, 7 
March 1559).
63 Lettere di Levante, vol. 27, f. 4v. The Costantinople mutto (mudd) was the equivalent of 512,8 
kg.
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This is the biggest order for cociumo ever presented to the Porte by Ragusa, 
which did not usually ask for more than 4,000-5,000 mutti.64 One gets the 
impression that the Republic wishes to reach a more “comfortable” situation, 
recalling the experiences of previous years, when even the Ottoman markets 
gave signals of uncertainty. The ambassadors’ requests are not going to be 
satisfied,65 but that letter shows, to some extent, the “strenght” of Ragusa. All 
the more so, if we add that, among the istructions sent to the ambassadors, 
there is one asking that “gionti in Constantinopoli debbiate informarve come 
lo paese di Varno sia abondante de miglio se da quello luogo se ne possa 
cavare, e quanta quantita, come detti migli siano boni e che prezzo se potran 
havere, et in che modo se potrano tragere e con quanta spesa se potranno 
condurre alla marina, e di tutto ne darete particolare aviso”.66
This unusual reference to the Black Sea is quite surprising: indeed the 
“Ottoman lake” had long been shut to Western merchants and the entire region 
had been assigned the exclusive function of supplying goods to the Turkish 
capital.67 We may thus see this reference as an indication of the peculiar 
position of the Republic of St Blaise within the Ottoman imperial system.68 
This is confirmed by new requests in the following years, for example in 1559, 
when the Republic will even dictate some conditions: “vogliamo [...] uno 
cociumo di potter cavar dalle parti di Varno mille mutti di miglio, ma che tale 
cociumo sia libero, et che li ministri nostri possino ditto miglio comprare da 
chi li parera”. Yet in the case “[...] lo volessero limitar, che tale miglio s’havesse 
comprare dalle persone serano dal Bassa determinate e specificate”.69
64 According also to Vesna Miović, Dubrovačka Republika u spisima osmanskih sultana. 
Dubrovnik: Državni Arhiv u Dubrovniku, 2005.
65 Morever, as they will later find out, “nel Volo, e [...] schala circumvicina è stata una triste 
annata” (ibidem, f. 43r).
66 Lettere di Levante, vol. 27, f. 5r.
67 Cfr. E. Özveren, »Black Sea and the Grain Provisioning of Istanbul in the Longue Durée« 
and, more generally, Charles King, Storia del Mar Nero: dalle origini ai nostri giorni. Roma: 
Donzelli, 2005 [original title: The Black Sea: A History. Oxford 2004].
68 About the “special favours” granted to Dubrovnik, see N. H. Biegman, The Turco-Ragusan 
relationship: pp. 106–125.
69 Lettere di Levante, vol. 27, f. 155v., 20 July 1559. On Ragusa’s attempts, beginning in the 
mid 1550s, to penetrate the Black Sea, see Bogumil Hrabak, Izvoz žitarica iz Osmanlijskog carstva 
u XIV, XV i XVI stoleću, Priština: Zajednica naučnih ustanova Kosova, 1971: pp. 292–294. Ragusa’s 
merchants already sailed across the Black Sea, as is attested, for example, by the request made by 
Nicolo di Sorgo to the Senate concerning one of his business partners who had been sent “in mare 
maggiore con ordine e commissione ampia di negotiare e fare incetta, di quelle mercantie, e cossae 
che le pareranno opportune [...]” (Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 50, f. 38v, 14 March 1551).
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The following course of events apparently rewards the foresight previously 
shown by Ragusa. In fact this crisis is strictly linked to the somewhat 
unexpected food shortage that will once again strike the Italian peninsula 
between 1560 and 1562: “Contra la commune e generale opinione, questo anno 
sie successo, che la ricolta de frumenti in alcuni luoghi, per innundatione delle 
aque, et in altri luoghi ch’ella nun è successa, si cume si sperava è stata triste, 
et per esser in ogni luogo gran domanda et molti compratori, noi siamo 
constretti, di ricorre alle parti di levante”.70
It seems that the Republic had prepared for the situation. In June 1559, the 
Senate instructs one noblewoman in Holland to ask King Philip for the 
reconfirmation of all the privileges gained by the citizens of Ragusa in the 
Kingdom of Naples and in Sicily, the most important of which was the annual 
grant of 500 carra of wheat.71 In December of the same year, the Senate cancels 
an order for the purchase of wheat in the Marca region, “perche trovandose per 
la divina gratia, stare alquanto commodi di frumento se tali grani da vui 
comprati, conducessimo quivi, ne veneriamo [!] a perdere pur assai”.72 More-
over, a month later, the Senate, requested to make a decision “super frumentis, 
quae habemus in civitate”, eventually grants permission “de emittendo 
frumentum ex civitate, ut venundetur” for a maximum amount of 3,000 stara, 
choosing wheat from the Levant and the Marca region as the destination 
market.73 The famine, however, has once again struck the Ottoman capital: in 
December 1560 the Sultan sends 10 galleys to Volo in order to intercept ships 
loaded with corn and redirect them to Costantinople and, among others, two 
70 Thus the Rector of Ragusa wrote to the ambassadors in Constantinople who were instructed 
to request the cociumi for the importation of wheat (ibidem, f. 155r, 20 July 1559). In reading the 
Italian chronicles from that period, quoted by Corradi, the situation was really alarming, especially 
in the Northern part of the Peninsula: “La Signoria di Venezia fece dare a Verona mille staja di 
miglio di quello delle munizioni”, in Casalmaggiore the government made millet bread “ed in 
Cremona fu ajutato il popolo con grande quantità di riso” (A. Corradi, Annali delle epidemie: p. 
188).
71 Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 54, f. 292r, 27 June 1559. 
72 Lettere di Levante, vol. 27, f. 236v, 1 December 1559.
73 Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 55, ff. 57v-58r, 5 January 1560. A few days earlier Benedetto 
Gondola, who was Ragusa’s agent in Marca, had informed that wheat prices in that province ran 
high and that they were getting even higher, so that on the very same day it was decided to send 
150 carra of “bel grano di Levante [...] a fine, che voi cerchiate di farlo vendere ò costi, ò altrove 
nella Marca, ò in Ferrara, ò in Vinetia (Lettere di Levante, vol. 27, f. 252v).
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ships from Ragusa are seized.74 The crisis does not seem as serious as the one 
of 1555 had been,75 yet it does bring about some trouble, especially because a 
period of yasaķ begins, which means that exports from all the territory of the 
Ottoman Empire are banned.76 Venice will suffer the worst consequences of 
this situation, to such an extent that in March 1560 the Porte will refuse to sell 
corn to the Serenissima.77 Venice is thus forced to seek alternative solutions to its 
growing difficulties,78 but it will not refrain from using the one remedy that is 
always at hand, that is the seizure of ships from Ragusa,79 which is part of a wider 
strategy aimed at putting pressure on the Republic’s food supplying system.80
The general difficulties of this period will force Ragusa to diversify food 
supplies—as it had already done in the past—by deciding, first, to sell 30 stara of 
74 Lettere di Levante, vol. 28, ff. 124v-127r, letter dated 17 January 1561. The Rector reproaches 
Simone di Matteo Benessa, ambassador to the Porte, for his delay in giving the information—se 
“haveste mandato tal aviso per uno corriero apposta [...] forse sarebbe gionto prima delle gallere”—
and asks him to plead Ragusa’s cause with Chrustambassa (Rüstem Pasha, Soliman’s Grand Vizier), 
given that “queste due navi tanto giovamento portaranno a Constantinopoli quanto portarebbe uno 
bichiere d’acqua al mare, [...] perché sendo in Constantinopoli uno populo infinito, ha bisogno 
d’una grossissima provisione” (f. 125r).
75 This is in contrast with some Venetian documents—I refer to the dispatches sent to the Senate 
from Constantinople—in which one reads that in the capital there was no bread for three days in 
November 1560 and that the “disette” got worse in the following January “avec les tempêtes de la 
Mer Noire, qui détruisent ou dispersent les flottes du ravitaillement de la ville” (M. Aymard, 
Venise, Raguse et le commerce du blé: p. 134). There is no trace of all this in Ragusan documents 
(in this very same period Ragusa has a special ambassador in Constantinople who is instructed to 
attend some very important trade negotiations), and at the moment I can suggest no plausible 
explanation for such a discrepancy between the two sources.
76 For Ragusa this often causes difficulties in finding meat. See Acta Minoris Consilii, vol. 46, 
f. 125r, 9 September 1561: The price of wether at 12 follari and that of all other kinds of meat at 
10 follari “hoc donec iasachus durabit” (30 follari were the equivalent of 1 grosso and 1 libra was 
the equivalent of 358 grams).
77 See M. Aymard, Venise, Raguse et le commerce du blé: p. 134.
78 Venice will go as far as to appoint, in 1564, a person entrusted with organizing an illegal 
wheat trade resident in La Canea (Crete) (ibidem, p. 136).
79 Aymard counted 6 episodes of this kind between December 1563 and January 1566, totalling 
36,700 staia of wheat, i.e. about 22,000 quintals (ibidem).
80 It is only in this perspective that we may understand the seizure of “ottocento quaranta ducati 
d’oro, in 410 doppioni spagnoli” by the Balio of Corfu at the expense of one of Ragusa’s patroni, 
who had been sent to buy the wheat offered by the Sancakbey of Valona and was intercepted in 
the Venetian island, “del qual atto”—the Rector will write “Al Principe di Venetia”—“noi prendiano 
[sic] non minor meraviglia, che dispiacere, non sapendo imaginar la cagione [...]” (Lettere di 
Levante, vol. 28, f. 33v, 24 May 1560.
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beans from Alexandria each month81 and, later on, by storing durra and sorghum 
in the staple “pro usu pauperum”.82 At the same time, Ragusa will try to buy food 
supplies on the Neapolitan market, as proven by the order issued by the Senate 
to the massari bladorum for hiring some ships to Barletta and by the sub-
sequent decision to sell the wheat carried from Apulia at 11 grossi per copello.83
In April 1562 the crisis seems to be over. This is confirmed by the decision, 
made on the very same day, to lower the price of rye and to restart paying 
soldiers their wage, one third of which in corn.84 But here comes again the 
spectre of the ban on exports from the Kingdom of Naples. The Republic turns 
once again to the Sublime Porte asking for help. Considering “la gran penuria 
di grani, nella quale si ritrovamo per causa delle tristissime raccolte successe 
in Italia”, the Rector asks for the maximum effort in order to gain some 
cochiumo and, given that Ragusa is “sempre stata promptissima et hora più che 
mai alli servigii di sua Altezza è conveniente cosa che noi siamo accomodati 
di tre mille mutti di frumento se non più, da cavarsi dalle parti di Volo, e 
luoghi circumvicini, la quale concessione dovera essere tanto più facile, quanto 
che in Constantinopoli per la gratia di Dio si trova abondanza, no solamente di 
frumento ma di qualunque altra cosa necessaria al vitto humano”.85
But Volo’s scala is shut—and it will remain so for a long time—to ships 
from Ragusa, which will be more and more often diverted towards Valona. 
Albania is thus about to become Ragusa’s privileged wheat market,86 and this 
will not fail to have a positive—and sometimes, as we shall see, also a 
negative—influence on the history we are telling.87
81 Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 56, f. 3r., 23 settembre 1561: the price of 7 copelli and 5 
parvoli is apparently the lowest in the last two years, which is an indication that this product could 
be easily supplied (see Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 55).
82 Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 56, f. 39v, 16 December 1561.
83 Ibidem, f. 1r, 17 September 1561 and f. 65v, 2 April 1562.
84 Ibidem, f. 87r, 30 April 1562.
85 Lettere di Levante, vol. 29, f. 15rv, 19 August 1562. The letter also contains—once again—
instructions for the request of cochiumi to import millet from Varna and “cavare di Alessandria 
carri 200 di fave, significando a quelli Signori che per havere noi gran populo, conveniene che 
procuriamo di nutrirlo, e ci bisogna havere ogni sorta di biade [...]” (f. 16v).
86 See B. Hrabak, Izvoz žitarica iz Osmanlijskog carstva: p. 312 and following.
87 Moreover, one should not forget the impact of Rupe, the big public granary, whose construction 
was completed by the beginning of the 1560s (see S. d’Atri, »“Adi 2 di marzo 1590 porta fornita”«). 
It is not by mere chance that one of the first documents attesting its effectiveness was a decree 
issued by the Minor Council asking that the official called scrivano del frumento “curam habere 
et tenere debeat” of the new wheat carried from Valona which must be stored “horreis novis nostris” 
(Acta Minoris Consilii, vol. 50, f. 13r, 27 November 1570).
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Albania will play this role even in the more difficult years 1585-86—terrible 
years88—with famine striking on many Mediterranean regions and on some 
European areas as well, such as central and northern France.89 As far as Ragusa 
is concerned, events follow, once again, the scenario we are familiar with “di 
grani habbiamo bisogno grandissimo e non habbiamo da poterci provedere 
d’altrove che dal paese di gransignore, essendo stato da pertutto cativissime 
racolte, et essendo fatta la prohibitione della estrattione”.90
The situation is alarming for the Republic. At the beginning of 1586, the 
Senate deliberates on the city’s corn requirements, asking the competent 
Officials to monitor the situation: given that the monthly requirement “singole 
familie tam nobilium quam civium” is 1.5 copelli per capita, the Senate decrees 
that, in case of need, the Massarii bladarum must report on the twentieth day 
of each month to the Minor Council so that it may take the due measures.91 
Thereafter, during the same meeting, the Senate forbids the sale of the wheat 
carried overland to Pile and Ploče (the city’s gates), ordering that it must be 
stocked in the public warehouses and then sold on behalf of the municipality 
at the price of 13 grossi per copello.92
This price will not last for long. In a year’s time frumentum comunis will 
rise up to 18 grossi (in March 1587),93 and will jump to 22 grossi two months 
later.94 But the main sign of the crisis may be seen in the huge amounts of food 
supplies granted by the Republic to its subjects from January 1586 onwards. 
“Res cibarias” are sent far and wide, covering almost the whole territory of the 
Republic, starting with 100 stara of millet for the poor of the island of Lopud;95 
88 How can we forget, for instance, Naples’ revolt of 1585 and the lynching of Giovanni Vincenzo 
Farace, which was triggered by the decision to raise the price of bread. See Rosario Villari, La 
rivolta antispagnola a Napoli: Le origini, Bari: Laterza, 1994 [11976]: pp. 33-58.
89 On this famine, which may be regarded as “l’une des plus graves pénuries de céréales qui aient 
touché non seulement Rouen et la Normandie, mais un large Bassin parisien”, see Jacques Bottin, 
»Négoce et crises frumentaires. Rouen et ses marchands dans le commerce international des blés 
(milieu XVIe – début XVIIe siècle)«. Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine 45/3 (1998): p. 565.
90 Lettere di Levante, vol. 35, f. 189v, 16 July 1585.
91 Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 68, f. 262v, 4 January 1586.
92 Transgressors will be fined 100 perperi (ibidem, f. 263r).
93 Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 69, f. 105, 21 March 1587. The wheat came from Valona. No 
longer than 8 months before, Albanian wheat was sold in the storehouse at 12 grossi (Acta Consilii 
Rogatorum, vol. 68, f. 10v, 2 June 1586).
94 Ibidem, f. 146v, 27 May 1587: in this case the price refers to 400 stara of deteriorated wheat 
from Apulia, which was stored in the city’s granary (and this demonstrates both the better quality 
of Apulian wheat and the gravity of the situation).
95 Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 68, f. 275v, 23 January 1586.
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100 stara of millet, 40 stara of wheat and 20 stara of oil are sent to Stagno for 
the inhabitants of the Terre nuove; and, finally, 50 stara of millet, 10 stara of 
wheat and 10 stara of oil are sent to Trsteno “pro subventione hominum a 
Slano versus orientem”.96
Ragusa will have to exert strong pressures upon its “protectedˮ supplying 
markets in order to overcome this crisis. The letters written by the government 
to its envoys in Costantinople are more and more apprehensive and tend to 
emphasize Ragusa’s special relationship with the Porte, characterized by 
traditional munificence on one side and respectful gratefulness on the other: 
“trovandoci in grand[issi]mo bisogno di grani ne sapendo voltarci altrove che 
alla benignita del Gransignore sotto la cui prottettione siamo stati sempre 
conservati”, thus writes the Rector to Nicola Prodanelli, an envoy to 
Costantinople, and adds: “Noi perdirvi quello che è in effetto siamo senza ogni 
sorte di biave, e patiamo una estrema necessita, et se non veniamo provisti 
presto, sara molto male si che per quanto desiderate far servitio alla patria 
usate ogni cura studio e diligenza, et operate quanti amici havete per farci 
havere quanto prima li sudetti chochiumi [...]”.97
The cociumi will eventually arrive,98 as will arrive the corn from Sicily99 
and from Senigaglia, in the Marca region.100 But a “universal famine” is also 
on its way.
96 Ibidem, f. 286, 8 February 1586. The day before, the Minor Council had also granted the 
permission to carry to Stagno “ex alienis locis [...] genus segetum” and to sell it at a free price, on 
the one condition that it would not be higher than that of Ragusa. This faculty was also extended 
to bread, which had to be sold at Stagno’s usual price (Acta Minoris Consilii, vol. 58, ff. 207v-208r).
97 Lettere di Levante, vol. 35, ff. 117v-118v, 10 September 1585.
98 Lettere di Levante, vol. 35, ff. 149v-151v, 30 August 1586: “li chochiumi per l’estratione di 
grani e migli della Valona et d’Albania habbiamo ricevuti e ci pare che stano bene. Iddio faccia 
che habbino l’effetto come è il desiderio nostro”.
99 Acta Minoris Consilii, vol. 59, f. 18r, 11 July 1587: as many as 2,700 stara, “exonerati in 
Pescariam, et inde deportati in orea comunis”.
100 Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 69, f. 203r, 9 November 1587: the sale price is fixed at 18 
copelli and a half.
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Siamo senza un granello di grano onde patiamo: the 1590-91 crisis
Shortly after a disastrous famine had struck the whole of southern Europe 
between the end of 1590 and the first months of 1591, in the Discorso sopra la 
carestia e fame, Giovan Battista Segni wrote: “[...] se era carestia in una 
provincia, era abbondanza in un’altra, onde una poteva aiutar l’altra. Veniva il 
grano d’Egitto, d’Affrica, di Turchia, di Marsilia, di Francia, di Sardegna, 
d’Asia, di Sicilia, di Grecia, di Spagna. Ma come oggidì quasi tutti siamo 
increduli e scelerati al possibile, la carestia è universale”.101 This famine was 
different from the previous ones: people living in those times, who were 
accustomed to grain shortages, perceived it in a dramatic manner, of which 
Segni’s words are perhaps the most famous example.102
In actual fact, the famine of the early 1590s was not so “universale”: it 
struck mainly the Italian peninsula,103 the Iberian peninsula and the eastern 
Mediterranean, and it was caused by a series of bad harvests in Italy, starting 
from 1586, compounded by the terrible atmospheric conditions—very rainy 
winters followed by unusually cold summers—of the biennium 1589-90.104 
Central and Northern Europe were not affected by the famine. As a result, they 
soon became the target of the appeals launched by many of the European 
states that had been deprived of their customary supplying markets,105 to such 
101 Giovan Battista Segni, Discorso sopra la carestia e fame. Ferrara: appresso Benedetto 
Mamarello, 1591, now published in I forni di Maiolo, ed. Girolamo Allegretti. [Studi Montefeltriani 
– serie monografica, 14]. San Leo: Società di Studi Storici per il Montefeltro, 1997: p. 42.
102 The cause is probably to be found in the growing intensity of these crises that do not, however, 
simultaneously become less frequent. Indeed—as we already saw—one may count, more or less, 
one crisis every five years, taking only the second half of the sixteenth century into account. See 
F. Braudel’s considerations in Civiltà e imperi nel Mediterraneo nell’età di Filippo II: pp. 630-631.
103 “Roma la prova, Venezia la sa, la Lombardia la connosce, Toscana la gusta, il Piemonte la 
sente, Romagna ne sta disperata, la Marca stenta, Napoli non n’è senza, e tutte le città, terre e 
castella e ville ne gemono e stridono” (G.B. Segni, Discorso sopra la carestia e fame: p. 30).
104 See some of the essays collected in The European crisis of the 1590s. Essays in Comparative 
History, ed. Peter Clark, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985 and especially the contributions: 
N. S. Davidson, »Northen Italy in the 1590s«: pp. 157-176, Peter Burke, »Southern Italy in the 
1590s: hard times or crisis?«, pp. 177-190 and James Casey, »Spain: a failed transition«: pp. 209-
228. According to Segni, this famine could have been caused only by God’s will, given that the 
“fame apunto è flagello appropriato alli peccati, che oggi sono il colmo e regnano in questi 
perversissimi tempi nostri” (G. B. Segni, Discorso sopra la carestia e fame: p. 29).
105 Although generally “the amount of Baltic grain shipped through the Sound was relatively 
small in aggregate terms (enough to feed about 750,000 people according to one calculation)”, it 
cannot be denied that “the margin was not invaluable in dearth years” (C. S. L. Davies, »Popular 
Disorder«, in: The European crisis of the 1590s: p. 252).
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an extent that in the port of Danzig, at the end of 1591, it was already impossible 
to find corn and ships, because of the “condotte che hanno fatto gli spagnoli, 
veneciani, fiorentini et altri particolari et si dice sian partite questo anno al 
meglio di trecento navi”.106
The very fact that many envoys from the Italian states were present, at the 
same time, in the Baltic ports is a sign that the situation was particularly 
serious.107 Certainly it was not the first time that corn from Northern Europe 
made its appearance in the Mediterranean,108 yet it is only in the 1590s, through 
the exportation of wheat, that Northern European navies really begin to 
penetrate into the Mare Interno ,109 where they will become predominant in the 
second half of the seventeenth century.110
As far as Ragusa is concerned, shortly before the crisis struck, the situation 
is apparently under control: “Trovandosi per Iddio gratia la Cità nostra ben 
provista di grani, e capitandone ogni di grani in molta quantità dalle parti 
d’Albania, e da terra ferma a prezzi honesti, oltre molte altre nostre provisioni che 
habbiamo fatto, et di Sicilia, et di Ancona, et dalla Vallona, nece torna conto trava-
gliarci nelli grani d’Abruzzo, o di Puglia perche ci sarebbero di molto danno”.111
106 Letter written by Robert and Sigismund Ausserstofer to the Duke of Mantua on 1 December 
1591, in Carlo M. Belfanti, »Una città e la carestia: Mantova, 1590-1592«. Annali della Fondazione 
Luigi Einaudi 16 (1982): p. 112. Mantua, instead, succeeds in obtaining supplies of wheat coming 
from Bavaria, also on account of the personal ties between the duke’s family and the Habsburg 
(see pp. 117-118).
107 On Venice, see Mario Brunetti, »Tre ambasciate annonarie veneziane«. Archivio Veneto, 
ser. V, 93-94 (1956): p. 108 and ss.; on Florence, see Anna Maria Pult Quaglia, ’Per provvedere 
ai popoli’. Il sistema annonario nella Toscana dei Medici. Firenze: Olschki, 1990: pp. 120-121.
108 See the pages dedicated to the Portuguese and Spanish importations of wheat from the 
Baltic in the second half of the fifteenth century in F. Braudel, Civiltà e imperi nel Mediterraneo 
nell’età di Filippo II: pp. 631-636.
109 The “blé du Nord”, totally absent until 1585 in the registers of Livorno’s harbour, amounts 
to 47.06 % of the wheat imported in the biennium 1590-91, 94.42 % in the biennium 1591-92, and 
as much as 96.22 % in the following two years, and in the same period wheat from Sicily falls from 
47.06 % to 2.18 % (Fernand Braudel and Ruggiero Romano, Navires et Marchandises à l’entrée du 
Port de Livorne (1547-1611). Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1951: p. 107, table X). For a more 
general overview see also M. Aymard, Venise, Raguse et le commerce du blé: p. 155 and ss.).
110 On some of the more general issues concerning the presence of the northern ships in the 
Mediterranean see Elena Papagna, Grano e mercanti nella Puglia del Seicento. Bari: Edipuglia, 
1990 and Gigliola Pagano de Divitiis, Mercanti inglesi nell’Italia del Seicento: Navi, traffici, 
egemonie. Venezia: Marsilio 1990.
111 Lettere e commissioni di Ponente, ser. 27.6, vol. 6, f. 51r, 24 February 1589 (SAD). The 
Republic had been unjustly accused by the Vicerè of Naples for having redirected to Ragusa one 
ship loaded with wheat from Abruzzo destined to the capital.
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But it does not last for long. The summer of 1590 witnesses the first signs 
of famine. On 27 July the Senate grants freedom to carry wheat “et aliarum 
segetum” to Ragusa from anywhere, by land or by sea, and to sell it “vel in 
proprium usum convertere” without any restriction, all over the territory of the 
Republic.112 The following day a number of letters are sent to the Republic’s 
agents and ambassadors to the Bassa of Bosnia and Herzegovina, asking them 
for information about the possibility of buying wheat.113
It is not surprising, therefore, that in a letter to Marco Buzignolo and Orsatto 
Cerva, ambassadors in Costantinople, one may find an explicit statement that 
“Noi ci troviamo in grandissima necessità del vittovagliamento per il 
mancamento delli grani et di altre vettovaglie [...]”.114
The following letter addressed to the same ambassadors at the end of 
October portrays a situation that is unfolding all its nasty implications: “Li 
hochiumi che ci havete mandato per la estrazione di formento et di migli di 
Valona, et di Albasan non ci serveno a nulla perche in tutti li detti luoghi vi è 
mancamento et di piu le galere Venetiane vi si trattengono tutta via attorno, le 
quali ci tengono assediati”.115
Here are two of the leitmotiv that will characterize this crisis from Ragusa’s 
perspective:116 the difficulties in resorting to its habitual—and often 
providential—protected supplying markets and the obstacles caused by 
constant presence of the Venetian navy,117 whose activities in the Gulf had 
already been planned at the end of August and were to be justified “per nuova, 
che teniate di corsari”, as we find stated in the ordinance issued by the Senate 
112 Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 70, f. 240r.
113 Lettere di Levante, vol. 37, ff. 85r-86v. Bassa, or Beylerbey, was the governor of Beylerbeyilik 
(Eyâlet), the largest administrative unit in the Ottoman Empire.
114 Ibidem, f. 97r, 4 September 1590.
115 Ibidem, f. 119r, 31 October 1590.
116 One should not forget another aspect that makes this crisis even more difficult. In this period 
the Republic of Saint Blaise is fully involved in the so called “Enecano crisis”, that is with the 
problems triggered by the attempts made by the former Nāzir of Belgrade Ine Hān, from 1580 
onwards, to occupy part of Ragusa’s territory assuming the title of Sancakbey of Konavle. On this 
very important yet little-known affair, see the chapter entitled “Ejnehanova kriza” in Toma Popović, 
Dubrovnik i Turska u XVI. veku. Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga, 1973: pp. 340-364 and N. 
H. Biegman, The Turco-Ragusan relationship: pp. 61-63.
117 “Quanto alla necessità di grani in che ci troviamo”—the Rector writes to the ambassadors 
in Costantinople in November 1590—“conviene che voi vi sforziate servirci come vi habbiamo 
scritto [...], perche ne patiamo molto havendoci le Galere Venetiane presso con due navette ducento 
carra di grani di Sicilia” (Lettere di Levante, vol. 37, f. 121r, 8 November 1590).
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of the Serenissima on 31 August 1590.118 The immediate result is that Ragusa, 
at least in the first and most difficult phase of the crisis, will have to rely for 
food supplies on its local markets, which are often based on smuggling, as one 
may deduce from the small amounts of goods mostly carried by foreign 
merchants, which is something quite unusual for the Republic.119
But it is the shut down of the Albanian market that represents the keystone of 
this crisis. The shut down is not caused mainly by the “mancamento”, to which 
the Rector referred in the letter mentioned above, but rather by the fact that the 
local population, faced with a severe food shortage, does not hesitate to take 
arms, so as to prevent local corn from being shipped abroad. On 18 September 
1591 Ragusa’s consul writes from Valona that there is not “molta copia di grani 
et che quei populi tengono l’armi in mano per non lascarlo estrare ad alcuno”.120 
Undoubtedly, it is not the first time that Albania proved to be a dangerous 
country. Starting from at least 1575, as B. Hrabak had once highlighted,121 the 
struggle of the local population against Ragusa had become one of the recurring 
features of this commercial partnership: this critical situation will reach its 
peak in 1583, when Giovanni Gionoma, the presbyter to whom Ragusa had 
commissioned the purchase of corn in Albania in the previous few years, got 
killed in Durrës.122 The tension runs so high that the Rector writes to the 
118 See M. Brunetti, »Tre ambasciate annonarie veneziane«: p. 108. The novelty is not so much 
in the requisitions, which, as we already saw, represented one of the food supplying system used 
more frequently by Serenissima, but rather in the systematic character of these actions. One must 
remind that Venice itself had undergone similar attacks during the famine of 1539-40, when 
Barbarossa “dopo la presa di Castelnuovo, tenendo chiuso il Golfo di Cattaro, non lasciava entrare 
vettovaglia di nessuna sorta nella città” (A. Corradi, Annali delle epidemie: p. 117, n. 3).
119 See the decrees issued by the Minor Council from January 1591 onwards that very often 
refer to payments for the purchase of grain (mainly wheat, but also millet and barley) carried by 
small Turkish and Greek boats, whose cargos range from 14 to 142 stara (Acta Minoris Consilii, 
vol. 61, f. 4r and ss.).
120 Lettere di Levante, vol. 37, f. 243v. This struggle very much recalls—if the comparison does 
not sound too bold—the battles fought at the other end of Europe, in England, where during the 
first half of the eighteenth century the popular classes firmly appealed to the principle, which was 
a non negotiable part of their ’moral economy’, that “wheat must be consumed in the region where 
it was produced, especially in times of famine” (Edward P. Thompson, »L’economia morale delle 
classi popolari inglesi nel secolo XVIII«, in: Idem, Società patrizia cultura plebea: Otto saggi di 
antropologia storica sull’Inghilterra del Settecento. Torino: Einaudi, 1981: p. 79).
121 See B. Hrabak, Izvoz žitarica iz Osmanlijskog carstva: pp. 316-318.
122 Lettere di Levante, vol. 35, ff. 5r-9v, 8 September 1583: Gionoma was out of the ship together 
with many sailors and had already received the wheat, when “vennero molti e molti Turchi di 
Durazzo” that killed the friar, stole four thousand thalers, “ferirno et bastonarno i marinari, et gli 
spogliorno tutti di camisa [...]” (ff. 6v-7r).
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ambassadors in Costantinople firmly asking them to appeal to Siaus bassa 
(Siyāvuş Pasha, Murād III’s Gran Visir).123 The latter, he states, “vuole che si 
proceda come nelle cause civili con intervento in iudizio dell’una e dell’altra 
parte co’ prove alla parte nostra”, whereas according to the Rector “queste son 
cause criminali, dove vi è il dispregio de comandamenti di sua Altezza”.124
What is it that makes the revolt of the 1590s different for Ragusa? Mainly, 
the lack of possible alternatives: “Siamo senza un granello di grano onde patiamo 
pur troppo non possiamo dove voltarci per poterci provedere de grani che ci 
bisognano, et per quanto siamo stati informati non lascaranno l’estrattione ne 
le tratte per questo anno nel regno di Napoli ne tampoco nel regno di Sicilia”.125
And the gravity of the situation is perfectly reflected in the verbal escalation 
revealed by the letters sent to the ambassadors to the Porte. At the beginning 
of March 1591 the Rector writes: “Noi stiamo male, et se presto non ci 
soccorrete staremo peggio, sollecitate, et vigilate per questo negocio [...], anzi 
trovate ogni via, et modo da poterci soccorrere con ogni prestezza in questa 
grandissima necessità in che ci troviamo”.126
Only a few days afterwards the situation becomes much more dramatic: 
“Noi stiamo molto male non habbiamo nella città [...] sorte di vettovaglie, se 
non grano per pochi giorni tutto il popolo patisce estremamente et li suditi 
nostri de territorio nostro non havendo con che sostentare muoreno ogni di di 
fame, insomma se presto non ci soccorrete ci troveremo in pessimi termini. 
Però [...] ingegnatevi di trovar ogni via et modo di poter comprare con ogni 
prestezza quella maggior quantità di migli et di formento che porrete havere 
non guardando al prezzo [...] et in mancamento di migli et formenti comprerete 
123 Only a few days after Gionoma’s killing, Ragusan ships were assaulted again. After gaining 
“un chochiumo [...] per estrarre per nostro uso una quantita di grani dalla Valona” and sending a 
ship “per caricarli et pagar i denari, sono stati alcuni insolenti nella Valona et vilipeso l’ordine di 
sua Altezza solevorno il popolo a impedire l’estratione di detti grani et piu volte assaltarno co’ 
l’arme [...] il ponte della nave et i marinari, et ne ferirno et bastonarno alcuni et credendo che il 
sopracarico si trovasse in una cassa nascosto l’abruciarno [...] onde i nostri impauriti di peggior 
successo sene tornarono a Ragusa in capo di tre mesi senza poter tener il carico” (ibidem, f. 7v).
124 Ibidem, f. 10rv, 5 October 1583. And he adds: the Republic deserves it, “perché attendendo 
noi giorno e notte senza risparmio di cosa alcuna, a servir co’ ogni nosttro potere questo Serenissimo 
Imperio” (f. 11r).
125 Lettere di Levante, vol. 37, f. 200r, 12 June 1591.
126 Ibidem, f. 163r, letter sent on 8 March 1591 to Matteo Ghetaldi, ambassador to the Sancakbey 
of Herzegovina.
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del pane, perche la gran necessità nostra ricever tutte quelle sorti di vittovaglie 
con che l’huomo si puo sostentare”.127
Eventually one gets to September of the same year when “per dirlo a voi ci tro-
vi amo senza un granello e se presto non siamo socorsi ci convene morir di fame”.128
This letter highlights the dramatic character of the crisis. In September 
1590 the Republic had already decided to ration the supplies of wheat that 
were distributed monthly “particularibus personis”: they were fixed at 1 
copello per capita.129 But prices are the best mirror of the situation: communal 
wheat, which at the beginning of the crisis, in August 1590, cost 20 grossi per 
copello,130 will rise to no less than 26 grossi in two months’ time,131 whereas 
the price of millet will rise even more, reaching 12 grossi per copello, the 
highest price in the century.132 
Ragusa faces all this first of all by tightening internal controls. Market 
regulations become even stronger. Besides the usual ban on the exports of 
wheat out of the Republic’s territory—which is typical of times of famine, but 
in this case is repeated in the forms that appear definitely more incisive, both 
substantially and verbally, and was accompanied by higher penalties133—there 
is the order “dominis iustitiariis ut facere debeant publicum proclama” 
forbidding the sale of corn without any exception.134 But one is above all struck 
by the instructions concerning bread, which for the first time135 introduce tight 
127 Ibidem, f. 168, letter sent on 15 March 1591 to Stefano di Nicolo, envoy in Alesso (that is 
Leshë, in Albania).
128 Ibidem, ff. 243v-244r, letter sent 18 September 1591 to Secondo de Luccari, envoy to the 
Bassa of Bosnia.
129 Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 70, ff. 256v-257r, 4 September 1590. I remind that, until then, 
the lowest limit of 1 copello and ½ had been reached at the beginning of 1586 (cfr. supra).
130 Ibidem, f. 245r, 6 August 1590: the Senate decided to raise the price on that occasion.
131 Ibidem, f. 262v, 19 October 1590.
132 Ibidem, f. 263r, 19 October 1590. In March the price was 7 grossi (ff. 160v-161r). In February 
1592 the Republic goes as far as to appoint two officials who are instructed to sell sorghum comunis 
in the city and in its territory at the price of 10 grossi per copello (Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 
61, f. 216r).
133 Acta Minoris Consilii, vol. 61, ff. 181v-182v, 23 December 1591: it was allowed to carry 
wheat only within the territory of the Republic and to the mills for grinding, provided one had a 
written permission by the Rector.
134 Ibidem, f. 196r, 3 January 1592.
135 The only precedent goes back to the 1520s, when the Republic first of all structured the 
control system and then placed the bread market under the competence of the new ufficiales 
pancocolarum (Acta Minoris Consilii, vol. 34, f. 161r, 9 July 1522 and f. 228r, 1 April 1523).
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controls over the final phase of the bread production process: on the one hand, 
all the city’s bakers are bound to give notice (to the ufficiales pancocolarum) 
of all the people that daily bring bread to be baked at their ovens; on the other 
hand, all the bakers and any other person that makes bread venalem “debeant 
ubi primum illum habuerint, et acceperint a furnaris” take it to the officials 
and weigh it before them (otherwise, sale is prohibited).136
These measures, perhaps more than others, give us a feeling of the gravity 
of the situation: Ragusa is a city where bread cannot be made and sold by 
private individuals; bread must be made from frumentum comunis and must 
be bought in the Platea,137 where one may find as many as 60 “mulieres pan-
cocolae pro conficiendo pane pro usu plateae”138 and where controls concern 
mainly the ban on selling flour, which was restricted to the bread-making of 
private persons. Yet one is very surprised, in the present state of research, by 
the total absence of prices and of any information on the bread production 
process, given that the government restricted itself to selling bakers the flour 
at fixed prices—mostly the same as the prices at the staple—and to control 
smuggling of both corn and flour. 
But the clampdown on internal resources is not enough to get out of the 
crisis. As Giovan Battista Segni wisely suggested, the “principale rimedio et 
aiuto che porgere si deve nelle carestie è mettere fuora o le biade o gli denari 
[...]”.139 And thus Ragusa will even be prepared to pay 28 grossi per copello 
(plus a commission of 2 grossi) in order to buy Levantine corn from Virgilio 
Corbizzi, from Florence, sopracarico of the navetta owned by Vincenzo 
Sliscovich from Ragusa;140 and the Republic will pay nothing less than 26 
136 Acta Minoris Consilii, vol. 61, ff. 114v-115r, 24 July 1591. Trangressors shall be whipped 
“in Platea in loco consueto”. The following month the Senate decrees that all the bakers are obliged 
to make “panem venalem ad mensuram” and an order is issued “officialibus pancocolarum” to 
choose 40 bakers (ibidem, ff. 194r, 195r, 19 August 1591).
137 Platea or Platea communis was the city area between the Customs (Sponza) and the Cathedral 
where the market was situated and where the public activities of the Republic were concentrated. 
It was connected to Platea magna, or Placa (Stradun), the main street, the center of the city’s 
economic life.
138 Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 45, f. 126r, 2 April 1541.
139 G. B. Segni, Discorso sopra la carestia e fame: p. 34. The “drama of wheat imported from 
distant, and even from far-off, regions”, Braudel states, “is a measure of men’s hunger, but it is also a 
measure of buyers’ wealth” (F. Braudel, Civiltà e imperi nel Mediterraneo nell’età di Filippo II: p. 631).
140 Lettere e commissioni di Ponente, vol. 6, f. 198, 22 April 1591. The price is accepted “benche 
qui nella città nostra si vendono li grani di Sicilia che sono molto migliori di quei di Levante, a 
grossi venti sei il copello” (f. 198r).
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grossi per copello in order to buy corn from Volo —which now reappears in 
Ragusa after more than thirty years—“a particularibus personis”.141
The Republic will exert the maximum pressure on all possible supplying 
markets, and will try to take the best possible advantage from the ‘situation 
rent’ accumulated after years of privileged relationships with the various 
Ottoman officials.142 This pressure will be brought to bear especially on the 
continental regions of the Balkans—the Republic instructs its ambassadors to 
write “una lettera alli mercanti in Saraevo che facino le incette di grani con 
bona licenza del Signor Bassa”143—and corn will arrive from the Balkans. In 
October 1591 the Rector writes to Valentino de Giorgi, ambassador to the 
Sancakbey of Herzegovina: “Con la vostra lettera di primo del corrente ci 
havete scritto la prestezza trovata et nel signor Sangiacco, et nel suo chichaia 
di concedere il passo libero ad ogni sorte di biave havendo il paese di 
Herzegovina piu grande abondanza di migli raxi [segale], orzi sorghi et avena 
infuori di formento del quale il paese ne haveva carestia”.144
Yet, as the Rector himself will have to admit, “vediamo le promesse larghe 
ma non ancora gli effetti”.145
To conclude: why is the 1590-91 crisis different?
No doubt the crisis of the 1590s was one of the most disastrous in the 
sixteenth century that marked a watershed in the general history of Europe, 
particularly in the history of the Mediterranean. There were different reactions 
to this crisis, depending on the economic resources that each of the governments 
141 Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 71, f. 188r, 9 January 1592.
142 Ragusa sometimes even buys wheat when it does not need it, with the only aim of winning 
the favours of the various local potentates who draw much of their revenues from the sale of wheat. 
See, for example, the letter sent in February 1579 to Giacomo Codutto, consul at Valona, where it 
is clearly stated that “sebene noi siamo abondantemente provisti delli grani, habbiamo non di meno 
animo di fornirci costi di stara Ragugei quattro milla [...], alli quali Mufetise, et Ciauso farete 
sapere che prendiamo li detti grani piu presto per satisfare a loro che per altro” (Lettere di Levante, 
vol. 33, ff. 168v-169r, 5 February 1579 (Mufetise, that is Müfettişi, a fiscal inspector and Ciauso, 
that is Çavuş, was a Palace official who was often sent to the provinces to carry out orders).
143 See the letter, already quoted, dated 18 September 1591, addressed to Secondo de Luccari, 
envoy to the Bassa of Bosnia in Lettere di Levante, vol. 37, f. 244r.
144 Ibidem, f. 248v, 9 October 1591. Chicaia, or Kethüdâ, was generally a deputy of the provincial 
governor, in this case he was the deputy of the Sancakbey.
145 Ibidem, f. 249r.
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involved was able to muster, but they all went towards ensuring the subsistence 
of growing masses of people146 in an attempt, certainly successful, to avoid 
serious consequences at the social level.147
And what about Ragusa? The Republic is apparently well prepared for this 
situation. It possesses solid economic and financial foundations and a com-
mercial power having its mainstay in one of the strongest navies in the Mediter-
ranean.148 Its food-supplying structure can rely on diversified markets both in 
the West and in the East, and, above all, on the “protectedˮ Ottoman markets; 
last but not least, Ragusa has a system for the storage of corn supplies with an 
overall capacity of 28–30,000 stara, half of which in the new, huge granary.149
Everything fine? Not exactly, if one considers that this crisis highlights both 
the strength and all the possible weakness in the system created by Ragusa. 
The crisis of the 1590s is not the hardest for the Republic of Saint Blaise. In 
fact, the crisis of the years 1539–41 was worse, especially for the contemporary 
“double scourge”. In the 1590s, however, Ragusa can no longer play on different 
fronts. The shut down of the Apulian markets, on which Maurice Aymard’s 
analysis relied to a considerable extent, is important for Ragusa especially 
when it cannot turn to the Ottoman markets: Ragusa, in other words, is not like 
Venice, and for Ragusa “le déclin du blé turc”150 does not at all mean the end 
of food supplies from the Levant. Of course, for many years Ragusa will have 
to be satisfied with Albanian wheat, but this is a handy market, based upon 
long-standing political and economic relationships.
146 One may read, for example, some descriptions of the Italian situation in A. Corradi, Annali 
delle epidemie: pp. 302-305.
147 “The surprising feature about western Europe in the 1590s is not the extent of popular 
disorder but, by and large, its successful containment” (C.S.L. Davies, »Popular Disorder«: p. 251).
148 Jorjo Tadić reckons that in the period 1570–1585 Ragusa’s fleet was made up by 170 ships 
with a capacity of 33 thousand carra (»Organizacija dubrovačkog pomorstva u XVI veku«. Istorijski 
časopis 1 (1948): p. 30 and, more generally, idem, »Le port de Raguse et sa flotte au XVIe siècle«, 
in: Le navire et l’économie maritime du Moyen-Age au XVIIIe siècle principalement en Méditer-
ranée, ed. Michel Mollat. Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1958: pp. 9-26. According to Edoardo Grendi, Genua 
could not by any means compete with “Ragusa’s merchant navy, that also played a prominent role 
in the trade of Genua’s harbour” so that Ragusa’s navy may be more properly compared to that of 
Venice “also considering that the trade of the Venetian harbour was tributary to Ragusa’s navy” 
(Edoardo Grendi, »Traffico e navi nel porto di Genova fra 1500 e 1700«, republished in: Idem, La 
repubblica aristocratica dei genovesi. Politica, carità e commercio tra Cinque e Seicento, Bologna: 
Il Mulino, 1987: p. 337).
149 See S. d’Atri, »“Adi 2 di marzo 1590 porta fornita”«.
150 M. Aymard, Venise, Raguse et le commerce du blé: p. 135 and ss.
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It is no chance that when that market shuts down, Ragusa falls into a crisis. 
The famine of the 1590s represents the first crisis of Ragusa’s food supplying 
system or, to say it better, the first sign of future problems. Because Ragusa 
cannot, even if it wishes, operate in a different manner. Even when facing its 
worst difficulties in obtaining food supplies, Ragusa knows it can rely on the 
system it has built with a mixture of political genius and commercial enterprise 
to such an extent that its ambassadors in Bosnia—with a half-hidden rhetorical 
blackmail—may frankly ask that “per conservare la citta tributtaria et divota 
del gran Signore la voglia soccorere con una quantita di grani facendo spedire 
subito li sua ministri per tutti quei lochi del suo paese dove è fatta bona raccolta 
questo anno e facendo levar quella quantita maggiore che sia possibile et 
condurre alla città nostra”.151
And we finally arrive to that masterpiece in the art of rethoric which is 
represented by the letter sent October 1591 to the ambassador to the Sancakbey 
of Herzegovina: “Noi stiamo molto male trovandoci senza grani, et se fin qui 
il popolo nostro si è cibato con li fichi et con le uve, nel avenire non havremo 
più [...] cibo [...], voi con ogni prestezza ci soccorriate, che altrimente converra 
a tutti morire miseramente di fame [...].”152
In this document Ragusa’s extraordinary ability in taking a stand in front of 
its commercial and political partners is very well represented. With what we 
may regard as a highly symbolic display of strength, the Republic declares that 
its people survive by eating the available and very nourishing food. Here we do 
not only find the usual appeal to the benevolence of the powerful Ottoman 
neighbour, which is typical of what I defined as Ragusa’s “corn diplomacy”:153 
even in the middle of one of the most devastating grain shortage crises of the 
sixteenth century, the Republic does not abandon its modus operandi and tries 
not to fall to the rules of “nature” and of the economy, which would have liked 
to see it—in accordance with the famous and already mentioned report of a 
Venetian ambassador—“tutta piena di timore”. 154
151 See the letter dated 18 September 1591, quoted above, in Lettere di Levante, vol. 37, ff. 
243v-244r.
152 Ibidem, f. 247v, 3 October 1591.
153 This issue is at the core of the research I am about to finish, to which I refer the readers for 
further details.
154 Cfr. supra, note 25.
